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credit constraints on the overall lifetime acquisition of human capital. We also review
the intergenerational literature and examine the macroeconomic impacts of credit con-
straints on social mobility and the income distribution.
A common limitation across all areas of the human capital literature is the impo-
sition of ad hoc constraints on credit. We propose a more careful treatment of the
structure of government student loan programs as well as the incentive problems un-
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capital helps explain observed borrowing, schooling, and default patterns and o®ers
new insights about the design of government policy.
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Education and other human capital investments are central to both individual and economy-
wide development. By limiting the incentives and capacity to invest in human capital, credit
constraints play an important role in determining aggregate productivity, national income
distributions, social mobility, and economic growth and development (Becker 1975). This
article reviews recent research in both the micro and macro literatures on human capital
investment and credit constraints.
Using a simple two-period model, in Section 2 we derive frequently tested implications
of constraints for schooling. U.S.-based evidence on the impacts of credit constraints on
college-going, as well as consumption and work during college, is reviewed in Section 3.
Evidence suggests that the increases in college costs and returns over the last two decades
have increasingly pushed more youth up against their credit limits.
Recent U.S. studies suggest that borrowing constraints may be more harmful for invest-
ments in young children. We review this evidence in Section 4 and discuss the bene¯ts of
considering multi-period investments in human capital. The high estimated degree of com-
plementarity between early and late investments suggests that post-secondary aid policies
may come too late to help many youth from disadvantaged families.
Section 5 reviews intergenerational studies in which borrowing constraints determine so-
cial mobility and the income distribution. Some of these studies also quantify the impacts of
education-based government policies on these outcomes. While recent studies are pessimistic
about the bene¯ts of additional subsidies for higher education, new e®orts to help ¯nance
earlier investments o®er more promise.
Ad hoc assumptions about credit constraints constitute a common limitation across all
areas of the human capital literature. In Section 6, we propose a more careful treatment of
government loan programs and the incentive problems underlying private credit. We show
that endogenizing credit constraints for human capital helps explain certain features of the
data. We also demonstrate how the modern literature on optimal contracts under limited
commitment and private information can help provide new insights about the behavior of
human capital investments and the design of government programs.
12 Human Capital with Exogenous Borrowing Constraints
In this section, we use a simple two-period model of human capital investment to examine
the key economic trade-o®s and empirical relationships studied in the literature on education
and borrowing constraints.
2.1 A Basic Model
Consider two-period-lived individuals who invest in schooling in the ¯rst period and work in
the second. Their preferences are
U = u(c0) + ¯u(c1), (1)
where ct is consumption in periods t 2 f0;1g, ¯ > 0 is a discount factor, and u(¢) is strictly
concave and increasing and satis¯es standard Inada conditions.
Each person is endowed with ¯nancial assets W ¸ 0 and ability a > 0. Initial assets
capture all familial transfers while ability re°ects innate factors, early parental investments
and other characteristics that shape the returns to investing in schooling. We take (W;a) as
given to focus on schooling decisions that individuals make largely on their own; however,
central results generalize naturally to an intergenerational environment in which parents
endogenously make transfers to their children (see Lochner and Monge-Naranjo 2011b).
During the schooling period, individuals make human capital investments h that increase
post-school labor earnings y = w1af (h). Each unit of h entails foregone wages w0 ¸ 0 and
tuition costs ¿ > 0; w1 is the price of human capital and f (¢) is positive, strictly increasing
and concave. A higher ability a increases total and marginal returns to investment.
Young individuals can borrow d (or save, in which case d < 0) at a gross interest rate
R > 1. Consumption levels in each period are
c0 = W + w0(1 ¡ h) ¡ ¿h + d, (2)
c1 = w1af (h) ¡ Rd. (3)
Unrestricted optima. In the absence of credit market frictions, individuals maximize
utility (1) subject to (2) and (3). This maximization can be conveniently separated into
2two problems. First, human capital investment maximizes the present value of net lifetime






Optimal unrestricted investment hU (a) is strictly increasing in ability a and independent of
initial assets W.
Second, individuals optimally smooth consumption over time. Unconstrained optimal
borrowing dU (a;w) satis¯es the Euler equation:
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where W + w0 re°ects `full wealth', i.e. assets plus potential earnings if no time is devoted
to schooling. Unconstrained borrowing strictly decreases in wealth and increases in ability.
A higher ability increases borrowing for two di®erent reasons: (i) more able individu-
als wish to ¯nance a larger investment; and (ii) for any given level of investment, more able
individuals earn higher net lifetime income and wish to consume more in the ¯rst period. Be-
cause of (ii), unrestricted borrowing increases more steeply in ability than does unrestricted
expenditure on human capital investment: @dU
@a >
@[(w0+¿)hU]
@a . All else equal, the more able a
person is, the more he wants to borrow relative to his investment.
A Canonical Exogenous Constraints Model. Now, consider a ¯xed upper limit on the
amount of debt that individuals can accumulate:
d · ¹ d; (6)
where 0 · ¹ d < 1. Let ¸ denote the LaGrange multiplier on this restriction in the utility
maximization problem. The ¯rst order condition for d becomes:
u
0(c0) = ¯Ru
0(c1) + ¸; (7)
where ¸ > 0 when the constraint binds and ¸ = 0 otherwise. The equation dU(a;W) = ¹ d
de¯nes a threshold level of assets Wmin (a) determining who is constrained (W < Wmin (a))
and who is unconstrained (W ¸ Wmin (a)).
3When constraints do not bind, optimal investment and borrowing are given by the un-






= R + ¸
¤;
where ¸¤ = ¸
¯u0(w0af[hX(a;W)]¡R¹ d) is positive and decreasing in the borrowing limit, ¹ d.1
Constrained persons have high ability relative to their wealth, since Wmin (a) is increasing
in ability. It is worth noting that being `unconstrained' may require much higher wealth W
than is necessary to cover tuition (i.e. W+w0 > ¿h does not ensure that dU(a;W) < ¹ d), since
individuals also borrow to smooth consumption. When the borrowing constraint binds, all
possibilities to bring future resources to the early (investment) period have been exhausted.
Then, the optimality condition for human capital investment hX is
(w0 + ¿)u
0 £
W + w0 ¡ (w0 + ¿)h















The implied function hX (a;W) strikes a balance between increasing lifetime earnings and
smoothing consumption, yielding a number of predictions that have been extensively exam-
ined in the empirical literature.
Empirical Predictions. Assume constraint (6) binds when referring to hX(a;W). Then:
1. Constrained individuals under-invest in their human capital: hX (a;W) < hU (a).
2. Unconstrained investment hU(a) is independent of wealth W, while constrained invest-
ment hX (a;W) is strictly increasing in wealth and the borrowing limit ¹ d.
3. The marginal return on human capital
w1af0[h]
w0+¿ is equal to the return on savings R
for unconstrained individuals and is strictly greater than R and strictly decreasing in
wealth W for constrained individuals.
4. Constrained investment hX(a;W) responds more negatively to an increase in direct
costs, ¿, than to an increase in opportunity costs, w0 (i.e. ¡@hX=@w0 < ¡@hX=@¿);
unconstrained investment responds equally to both costs (i.e. @hU=@w0 = @hU=@¿).
1This formulation draws a parallel with models that assume individuals face di®erent interest rates, R. A
higher ¹ d or lower W is analogous to a higher R. Assuming an increasing interest rate schedule yields similar
predictions to those discussed here.
4These results follow from implicit di®erentiation of equations (4) and (8). The ¯rst three
are well-known since Becker (1967). They derive from the fact that the marginal cost of
investment is higher for constrained individuals, since they cannot borrow to smooth con-
sumption over time. This causes constrained individuals to invest less, stopping school when
the marginal return is still relatively high. The fourth implication is derived by Cameron and
Taber (2004) in a slightly di®erent setting. Here, it derives from the fact that an increase in
opportunity costs also raises `full wealth' levels, while an increase in direct costs does not.2
We discuss empirical evidence related to these predictions in Section 3.
Lochner and Monge-Naranjo (2011b) discuss an additional prediction of this model.
They show that human capital investment, hX(a;W), will be decreasing in ability a for
constrained individuals if the consumption intertemporal elasticity of substitution (CIES),
¡u0 (c)=[cu00 (c)], is less than or equal to one (as most estimates in the literature suggest, e.g.
see Browning, Hansen, Heckman 1999).3 This result not only implies perverse cross-sectional
investment patterns, but it also implies that an increase in the price of human capital w1
should lead to aggregate reductions in investment among constrained individuals, since a
change in the skill price is analogous to increasing the ability of everyone in the economy.
In Section 6.1, we show that important features of government student loan programs and
private lending generate a more positive relationship between constrained investment and
ability (and w1).
2.2 Other Margins
Credit constraints are likely to a®ect other choices. As equation (7) makes clear, early
consumption is reduced when borrowing constraints bind. In fact, government student loans
link credit to educational expenditures, shifting the impact of borrowing constraints onto
2This asymmetry is more easily seen when investment can take only two values, h 2 f0;1g. In this case,
an increase in opportunity costs lowers resources in the no-schooling case when consumption is relatively
high, while an increase in tuition reduces resources in the schooling case when consumption is relatively low.
3The relationship between ability and constrained investment is driven by two opposing forces. On the
one hand, more able individuals earn a higher return on human capital investment, so they would like to
invest more. On the other hand, more able individuals have higher lifetime earnings, which increases their
desired consumption at all ages. Since constrained borrowers can only increase consumption during the initial
period by investing less, the latter e®ect discourages investment. With strong preferences for intertemporal
consumption smoothing (i.e. CIES·1), the second e®ect dominates.
5consumption rather than schooling investments (see Section 6.1).
The model above abstracts from leisure, so labor supply varies inversely one-to-one with
investment. More generally, constrained youth may also substitute leisure for work in order
to help alleviate the negative impacts of constraints on consumption and investment. Alter-
natively, constrained youth may choose to delay college (and its labor market rewards) for
a few years to accumulate savings.
Finally, youth may adjust on the school quality margin given any level of attendance.
The models above do not explicitly distinguish between school quality and quantity; however,
abstracting from opportunity costs (i.e. w0 = 0), one can simply re-interpret h in the model
above as the quality of school conditional on school attendance. With this interpretation,
constrained youth should attend lower quality institutions, with quality increasing in wealth
and the borrowing limit. This implies that wage returns from college attendance should be
lower for constrained youth, since they e®ectively invest less at lower quality schools. As
noted by Carneiro and Heckman (2002), this prediction contrasts sharply with the prediction
above that the marginal wage return to investment is higher for constrained youth.
2.3 Adding Tastes for Schooling
Much of the empirical literature on college attendance incorporates unobserved heterogenous
`tastes' for education. Augmenting utility (1) to include school taste »h and restricting
human capital investment choices to h 2 f0;1g (non-attendance vs. attendance) produces
a discrete choice schooling model similar to that of Belley and Lochner (2007). In this
environment, individuals choose whether or not to attend college maxfU0(a;W);U1(a;W)+
»g, where optimal borrowing/consumption would deliver Uh(a;W) ´ max
d
fu(W + w0(1 ¡
h) ¡ ¿h + d) + ¯u(w1af(h) ¡ Rd)g given schooling choices h 2 f0;1g, and the individual's
ability a and wealth W. Because individuals may enjoy (» > 0) or dislike school (» < 0),
schooling choices do not necessarily maximize lifetime income. This, along with the discrete
nature of schooling, generates some important di®erences with the model above regarding
the relationship between schooling and initial resources.
The observed probability that someone with ability a and wealth W attends college is
given by Pr[¡» < ¢(a;W)] where ¢(a;W) ´ U1(a;W)¡U0(a;W). Although the probability
6of attendance is lower when the borrowing constraint binds for any given (a;W) (analogous
to the model above), the probability of attendance is not generally independent of wealth in
the absence of borrowing constraints. As discussed in Belley and Lochner (2007), if the net
¯nancial return to college is positive and schooling tastes are independent of wealth, then
the probability of attending college should be decreasing in wealth (conditional on ability)
when borrowing constraints are non-binding.4 Need-based grant aid makes this relationship
even more negative. Of course, unobserved tastes for schooling may be positively correlated
with W, so this prediction is not particularly powerful on its own. More importantly, in the
absence of borrowing constraints, the relationship between wealth W and the probability
of attendance (conditional on ability) should become more negative (or less positive) as the
net ¯nancial returns to college increase, regardless of the underlying relationship between
» and W.5 Intuitively, an increase in the net returns to college raises the relative value of
college less for individuals with high initial wealth due to diminishing marginal returns to
consumption. This need not be true when borrowing constraints limit the consumption of
low-wealth individuals. Constrained youth may bene¯t little from an increase in future labor
market returns to school, since additional post-school earnings cannot be used to increase
consumption during school when it is most valuable. As discussed below, these results are
important for interpreting recent changes in family income { college attendance relationships
in light of the contemporaneous increase in returns to college.
3 Evidence on Borrowing Constraints and College
The empirical literature on borrowing constraints and higher education has primarily focused
on measuring the population of youth constrained and on the e®ects of borrowing constraints
on education decisions. A few studies also evaluate the impacts of potential constraints on
other behaviors at college-going ages (e.g. work in school, consumption allocations). We
summarize the recent empirical literature on borrowing constraints and post-secondary ed-
4The net ¯nancial returns are de¯ned as N(a) ´ ¡¿+R¡1w1af(1)¡[w0+R¡1w1af(0)]. When N(a) < 0,
the probability of attending college is increasing in W.
5This result assumes that the density for » is relatively °at in the population. Otherwise, if more low-
wealth individuals are on the margin of attending, it is possible that
@
2Pr(¡»<¢(a;W))




7ucation, distinguishing studies by their general approach.
3.1 Family Income/Wealth { Attendance Patterns
Many economists have examined the wide disparities in education by parental income, edu-
cation, and race to gauge the impact of borrowing constraints on education decisions.
Studies based on the 1979 Cohort of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79)
generally ¯nd that family income played little role in college attendance decisions during the
early 1980s. Cameron and Heckman (1998, 1999) ¯nd that, after controlling for family
background, adolescent cognitive achievement, and unobserved heterogeneity, family income
had little e®ect on college enrollment rates for this cohort of youth. Carneiro and Heckman
(2002) reach a similar conclusion.
Using data for the late 1990s and early 2000s (1997 Cohort of the NLSY, NLSY97), Belley
and Lochner (2007) show that family income has become a much more important determi-
nant of college attendance over time.6 Youth from high income families in the NLSY97 are
16 percentage points more likely to attend college than are youth from low income families,
conditional on adolescent cognitive achievement, family composition, parental age and edu-
cation, race/ethnicity, and urban/rural residence. This is roughly twice the e®ect observed
in the NLSY79. Belley and Lochner further show that the increased importance of income
was primarily focused on lower and middle ability youth.
The NLSY79 do not contain data on wealth; however, the combined e®ects of family
income and wealth in the NLSY97 are substantially greater than the e®ects of income alone.
Comparing youth from the highest family income and wealth quartiles to those from the
lowest quartiles yields an estimated di®erence in college attendance rates of nearly 30 per-
centage points after controlling for ability and family background. In an attempt to address
concerns about the endogeneity of family wealth, Lovenheim (2011) uses data from the Panel
Survey of Income Dynamics to estimate the impacts of exogenous changes in housing wealth
(driven by local housing booms and busts) on post-secondary enrollment decisions. His es-
timates suggest that an additional $10,000 in housing equity raises college enrollment by
6Ellwood and Kane (2000) argue that college attendance di®erences by family income were already be-
coming more important by the early 1990s.
80.7 percentage points, with much larger e®ects among lower income families. He also ¯nds
that the impacts of housing wealth have become more important in the 2000s; however, it is
unclear whether this is due to the increased liquidity of housing wealth or a general increase
in the e®ect of family resources on educational attainment.
Belley and Lochner (2007) also use the NLSY79 and NLSY97 to examine the changing
role of family income as a determinant of work during college, college delay, and the type
of institution attended (two-year vs. four-year).7 Among lower ability groups, they estimate
weak e®ects of income on weeks worked and hours worked per week in both NLSY cohorts.
In contrast, family income becomes a more important determinant of work during school for
the most able in the recent cohort. Among the most able NLSY97 college attendees, those
from low-income families work more weeks and nearly twice as many hours per week during
the school year as those from high-income families. While the growing e®ects of income on
attendance are largely focused on lower ability groups, the growing e®ects of income on work
are concentrated among the most able. Interestingly, Belley and Lochner estimate weak
e®ects of family income on college delay in both NLSY cohorts.
The relationship between family income and the type of post-secondary institution indi-
viduals attend has changed since the early 1980s. While family income had little e®ect on
the choice of two-year vs. four-year institutions in the NLSY79, students from the highest in-
come quartile in the NLSY97 are 11 percentage points more likely to be attending a four-year
institution than their counterparts from the bottom quartile (Belley and Lochner 2007).8 By
contrast, the relationship between family income and attendance at selective high quality
institutions appears to have weakened over this same period. Kinsler and Pavan (2010)
estimate that moving from the bottom to top income quartile increased the probability of
attending a top quality college by about 25 percentage points in the NLSY79 and by only
16 percentage points in the NLSY97. Among top (often private) schools, the sharp increases
in tuition since the early 1980s were generally accompanied by increases in ¯nancial aid for
7Their estimated e®ects of income on college delay and institution type for the NLSY79 are consistent
with those of Carneiro and Heckman (2002), who also examine these margins.
8Lovenheim and Reynolds (2011) also use the two NLSY cohorts to explore more detailed trends in college
enrollment by institution type. They estimate an important shift in enrollment from four-year to two-year
schools among men from high income/low ability and low income/high ability backgrounds. Among women,
college enrollment increases were largely focused in four-year institutions.
9lower income students. This e®ectively increased the price of college quality more for high-
income students relative to their lower-income counterparts. As such, it is unclear whether
these ¯ndings signal that low-income youth wishing (and able) to attend selective colleges
are less constrained now than in the early 1980s or whether these ¯ndings simply re°ect
changes in relative prices.
As emphasized by Carneiro and Heckman (2002), adolescent cognitive achievement has
much stronger e®ects on college-going than does family income. This is true in both NLSY
samples. Still, the fact that family income has become so much more important for atten-
dance in recent years suggests that credit constraints may have become more salient for many
American youth. As Belley and Lochner (2007) and Lochner and Monge-Naranjo (2011b)
discuss, both college costs and returns have risen substantially since the early 1980s. These
forces should have led to an increase in demand for credit among students; however, real
government student loan limits changed very little. The fraction of undergraduate borrowers
`maxing out' their federal Sta®ord loans nearly tripled over the 1990s to 52% (Berkner 2000
and Titus 2002).
Many factors shape the relationship between family income and schooling besides bor-
rowing constraints. Need-based ¯nancial aid is an important feature of American higher
education. In fact, tuition net of non-repayable aid is generally negative for very low-income
American youth attending in-state public universities (Belley, Frenette and Lochner 2011).
By lowering the net price of college for low-income youth relative to high-income youth,
need-based grants and scholarships tend to reduce income { attendance gradients through
price e®ects alone. Of course, the e®ects of aid depend critically on the extent to which
low-income youth are aware of available aid. This awareness, as well as tastes for schooling
more generally, may depend on social networks and peers. This would tend to amplify any
relationship between family income and schooling through social multiplier e®ects.
Finally, it is sometimes argued that higher income families place greater value on educa-
tion and that this may explain the positive relationship between family income and schooling.
If true, it is not clear why this relationship should have strengthened so much since the early
1980s.9 As the model of Section 2.3 shows, the well-documented increase in net returns to
9Nor, is it obvious why the income { attendance relationship should be so much stronger in the U.S.
10schooling since the 1980s should have weakened the income { attendance relationship in the
absence of borrowing constraints if the relationship between `tastes' for college and family
income had remained stable.
3.2 Di®erential Marginal Returns to Schooling
As Card (1999) notes, many instrumental variables (IV) estimates of the wage return to
schooling exceed ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates by 20-30%. Lang (1993) and Card
(1995, 1999) have conjectured that borrowing constraints may explain this ¯nding. They
point out that many IV studies use various institutional details a®ecting the marginal cost
of schooling (often college). If these instruments largely impact the decisions of low-income
and constrained youth, then these IV estimates re°ect the relatively high marginal return
to schooling for those that are constrained (based on the `local average treatment e®ect'
interpretation of IV).10 On the other hand, OLS estimates may more closely re°ect average
returns in the population, which may be lower.
Carneiro and Heckman (2002) raise concerns with this interpretation. First, many of the
instruments used are either `weak' or correlated with (typically unobserved) cognitive ability.
Second, IV estimates may exceed OLS estimates even in the absence of borrowing constraints
due to heterogeneity in returns to schooling and self-selection into di®erent schooling levels.
Third, once school quality di®erences are considered, borrowing constraints may lead to
lower returns per year of schooling. Moreover, the marginal cost of schooling may di®er for
reasons other than borrowing constraints, e.g. heterogeneity in tastes for schooling. High IV
estimates based on tuition variation or college proximity may simply re°ect the fact that
these instruments a®ect attendance decisions most for youth who dislike school.
Cameron and Taber (2004) push further on this issue. Based on the prediction that
investment responds more to direct costs than opportunity costs when individuals are bor-
rowing constrained (result 4 in Section 2.1), they estimate the returns to schooling using
separate instruments related to each of these costs. They argue that the set of individu-
than it is in Canada. Despite greater targeting of aid to low-income families in the U.S. relative to Canada,
post-secondary attendance gaps by family income are nearly twice as large in the U.S. compared to Canada
(Belley, Frenette and Lochner 2011).
10See Imbens and Angrist (1994), Heckman and Vytlacil (1998), or Card (1999) for more detailed discus-
sions of the interpretation of IV estimators in this context.
11als whose college-going is a®ected by a change in direct costs (measured by whether there
is a college in the individual's county of residence) should disproportionately include more
credit constrained youth than the set of individuals a®ected by a change in opportunity costs
(measured by local low-skill wage rates). Ignoring di®erences in college quality, if borrowing
constraints are important for college-going, then using `college in county' to instrument for
schooling should yield a larger estimate for the returns to schooling than using local low-skill
wage rates. Based on men from the NLSY79, they ¯nd the opposite, leading them to con-
clude that borrowing constraints are not important for college-going. By addressing issues
related to weak and invalid instruments and by explicitly comparing di®erent IV estimates,
their results overcome the ¯rst two criticisms raised by Carneiro and Heckman (2002). How-
ever, college quality di®erences can make it di±cult to draw strong conclusions about the
signi¯cance of borrowing constraints.
3.3 Structural Models
A few studies estimate lifecycle schooling models that exploit data on schooling choices,
earnings, and in some cases, assets and family transfers, to identify the role of borrowing
constraints. By estimating preferences, human capital production technology, and other im-
portant factors determining educational choices, this approach enables researchers to evaluate
a wide range of potential policies. We discuss three important papers in this literature.
Cameron and Taber (2004) estimate a lifecycle model with a discrete set of schooling
options to test di®erent discount rates in schooling choices. Evidence that some individuals
face high interest rates relative to others would imply that borrowing constraints distort their
education decisions. Using data on men from the NLSY79, Cameron and Taber estimate
discount rates that are consistent with optimal schooling choices given observed schooling
costs and earnings functions for di®erent types of individuals. The main source of identi¯ca-
tion for di®erences in discount rates is the di®erential roles played by opportunity costs and
direct costs as discussed above. Consistent with their IV analysis, they ¯nd no evidence of
discount rate heterogeneity in their sample.
Keane and Wolpin (2001) estimate a dynamic model of schooling, work, and consumption
behavior to explore the importance of borrowing constraints for all of these choices. Their
12framework incorporates (exogenously determined) parental transfers, which depend on both
parental education as well as an individual's own schooling enrolment choices. They use
panel data on schooling and work (full-time and part-time), wages, and assets for white
males in the NLSY79. Importantly, Keane and Wolpin allow for unobserved heterogeneity
in the ability to acquire human capital, tastes for work and school, and borrowing limits.
Estimated borrowing limits are very tight (ranging from $600 to $1000 across individuals,
in 1987 dollars) | less than one-third the estimated cost of a single semester of school (about
$3,700). Not surprisingly, then, simulations suggest an important role for parental transfers
and part-time work in enabling school attendance. The estimates suggest that parents pro-
vide between $3,300 and $10,000 in transfers while enrolled in school, where transfers are
increasing in parental education. Because transfers are estimated to be substantially lower
when students are not enrolled in school, a sizeable portion of parental transfers e®ectively
acts as a subsidy for education | a subsidy that is much larger for children with more edu-
cated parents. Based on a series of simulations, Keane and Wolpin conclude that nearly all of
the (sizeable) di®erences in educational attainment by parental education are accounted for
by higher enrollment-contingent parental transfers and unobserved heterogeneity. Although
they estimate tight (often binding) borrowing limits, increases in available credit have negli-
gible e®ects on schooling. Instead, increasing loan limits tends to reduce work and increase
consumption during school.
The model of Section 2.1 is useful for interpreting these results and understanding identi¯-
cation. Ideally, one would identify who is constrained by their consumption pro¯les; however,
Keane and Wolpin have no data on consumption nor do their data allow them to directly
infer consumption during school for most youth.11 As noted earlier, schooling patterns in
the NLSY79 are largely consistent with unconstrained investment; however, the low levels of
debt taken on by most youth suggest that borrowing limits are quite low. Since debt levels
appear to vary little with ability, many youth must be borrowing constrained; otherwise,
(unconstrained) borrowing should increase sharply with ability as shown in Section 2.1.12 If
11Asset measures are not generally available during most college-going years and there are no measures
of schooling costs or parental transfers. It is, however, possible to directly infer consumption from reported
income levels and changes in assets for older individuals that are no longer in school.
12Unfortunately, Keane and Wolpin (2001) do not report distributions of debt by ability type; however,
13many youth are in fact constrained, then the CIES would need to be greater than one in
order to generate a positive relationship between ability and schooling. Their high estimated
CIES of 2 implies that distorted consumption pro¯les are not particularly costly in utility
terms. Thus, borrowing constraints will have weak e®ects on schooling, and heterogeneous
income-contingent transfers are needed to explain the positive relationship between parental
education and schooling (conditional on ability type).
Using data on recent male high school graduates in the NLSY97, Johnson (2010) es-
timates a similar decision model with a few important di®erences. He explicitly models
government student loan programs as well as a private credit limit, allows for di®erences in
tuition across states, incorporates need- and merit-based grants, and allows for exogenous
unemployment. Most importantly, he exploits additional data on average tuition by state
and data on reported grant aid and parental transfers in the NLSY97.13 This better enables
him to infer consumption during and after school, which helps in identifying who may or
may not be constrained. His data allow him to directly estimate parental transfer functions
and student aid by parental income, while Keane and Wolpin (2001) have to infer parental
transfers indirectly from schooling and work choices (and asset levels in later years).
Some of Johnson's main ¯ndings are similar to those of Keane and Wolpin (2001):
parental transfers (especially the fact that schooling-contingent transfers are greater for
higher-income families) and unobserved heterogeneity are important determinants of school-
ing. Johnson also estimates modest borrowing limits relative to college costs. However, his
estimated credit limits are substantially greater than those of Keane and Wolpin (2001).14
Despite greater borrowing opportunities, Johnson estimates a stronger, though modest, im-
pact of increasing loan limits. Simulations suggest that an additional $1,500 in credit per
year in school would raise BA completion rates by 2.3%. Allowing students to borrow up to
the total costs of schooling would increase completion rates by nearly 4%. Given the low cost
estimated borrowing limits are similar across types suggesting little variation in debt along that dimension.
13Like Keane and Wolpin (2001), he also uses data on schooling, work, assets, and wages. Since many of
his respondents are still quite young, Johnson (2010) uses wages at ages 25+ from the NLSY79 cohort in
estimation. This e®ectively yields estimates that average the returns to schooling and experience across the
two NLSY cohorts.
14Youth attending college for four-years can borrow up to $23,000 from the Sta®ord Loan Program plus as
much as an estimated $7,000 in private loans for some types. Average annual tuition for Johnson's sample
is about $15,000. All ¯gures in 2004 dollars.
14of extending government student loan programs, Johnson (2010) estimates that increasing
loan limits would have a greater impact on college outcomes than an increase in educa-
tion subsidies costing the same amount. However, Johnson (2010) argues that subsidies are
necessary to generate large increases in college completion.
Borrowing constraints have small to modest impacts on schooling choices in these two
studies for very di®erent reasons. As discussed above, estimates from Keane and Wolpin
(2001) suggest that most students are constrained but that consumption and leisure are dis-
torted rather than schooling. That schooling is una®ected by borrowing constraints is not
surprising given other evidence based on the NLSY79. It is more surprising that Johnson
(2010) estimates that increasing borrowing limits would have only modest e®ects on college-
going given the increased importance of family income in the NLSY97. Despite the fact that
credit opportunities plus parental transfers allow for, at best, modest consumption during
school, Johnson estimates that few youth borrow up to their limit. This is almost certainly
due to risk aversion and the possibility of very low income associated with post-school un-
employment in his model.15 Because of this, his estimates suggest that few individuals are
willing to take on much debt. Indeed, his estimates suggest that very few choose to borrow
more than $10,000 (compared to nearly 20% of men in his data).16
Assumptions about minimal income (or consumption) levels are crucial for the importance
of borrowing limits in dynamic schooling models with uncertainty such as Johnson's. The
demand for credit can be much higher with explicit insurance mechanisms or implicit ones
such as bankruptcy, default, or other options (e.g. deferment and forgiveness in government
student loans). Despite their importance, the empirical literature has generally given little
attention to risk and insurance, issues we discuss further in Section 6.
Much of the relationship between socioeconomic background (parental education or in-
come) and college-going in Keane and Wolpin (2001) and Johnson (2010) is driven by
15If lim
c!0
u0(c) = 1, individuals that must honor all debts would never choose to borrow more than the
minimum value of the present discounted lifetime income, i.e. the `natural' borrowing limit of Aiyagari
(1994). Given Johnson's assumptions on unemployment income, the `natural' borrowing limit in his model
would be around $17,000 at college-going ages. However, Johnson (2010) does not fully solve the model
through the end of life, instead assuming a terminal value function at age 40 that depends positively on
remaining assets and skill levels at that age. As such, there is no actual `natural' limit in his framework.
16In related work, Navarro (2010) estimates that simultaneously removing both uncertainty and borrowing
constraints would substantially increase college attendance.
15schooling-dependent parental transfers: more advantaged parents provide greater schooling
`subsidies' to their children. This raises the question: why do wealthier parents e®ectively
subsidize so much schooling if their children are not willing to pay for it themselves? (Their
estimates suggest that many children would not attend without parental `subsidies' even if
credit were abundant.) Taken at face value, these results suggest that many parents must
value their children's education more than their children do. This gives rise to three po-
tential explanations for the strong positive relationship between parental income/education
and schooling-contingent subsidies: (i) All parents may value schooling the same, but poor
parents may be constrained in what they can a®ord to pass on to their children. (ii) All
parents may value schooling the same, but wealthier parents prefer to buy more of it like
they do other consumption goods. (iii) Wealthier parents may value schooling more than
poor parents. Ironically, these explanations mirror the earlier discussion of the wealth {
schooling relationship, only for parents rather than potential students.17
While the results of Keane and Wolpin (2001) and Johnson (2010) suggest that expansions
in student loan programs are likely to have limited e®ects on college-going (an important
result by itself), they e®ectively shift the `constrained' question up a generation. As such, it is
not clear how these results help explain the dramatic increase in family income { attendance
gaps over the past few decades. E®orts to endogeneize parental transfer decisions in these
models are needed to make more progress on this question.
Adolescent `endowments' or abilities also play a central role in determining the rela-
tionship between socioeconomic background and education (and earnings) outcomes in both
Keane and Wolpin (2001) and Johnson (2010). This is also true in studies explicitly an-
alyzing education gaps by family income (e.g. Cameron and Heckman 1998, Carneiro and
Heckman 2002, Belley and Lochner 2007). Yet, these `endowments' are typically treated as
exogenous and invariant to policy. Recent work discussed in Section 4 endogenizes these
endowments through early investments by families and schools.
17Explanation (i) is consistent with the ¯ndings of Brown, Scholz and Seshadri (2011) and Caucutt and
Lochner (2011). Explanations (ii) and (iii) are di±cult to reconcile with the strong increase in the returns
to college for reasons discussed earlier: unless the relationship between parental income and parental tastes
for schooling strengthened over time, the increased returns should have weakened the link between parental
income and schooling-contingent transfers.
163.4 Other Approaches to Identifying Constraints
Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2008) take a novel approach to measuring borrowing con-
straints by directly asking students enrolled at Berea College in Kentucky whether they
would like to borrow more if they could (at a `fair' interest rate). They, therefore, measure
the share of enrolled students that are constrained and the impact of being constrained on
college dropout rates. It is important to note that the typical student at Berea College
comes from a low-income family; however, the college is unique in that it e®ectively charges
zero tuition and o®ers large room and board subsidies. Despite these unique institutional
features, college dropout rates are quite similar to those for low-income students in the U.S.
as a whole. While Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2008) ¯nd that many Berea students
live on a very tight budget, only about one-in-¯ve reports that they would like to borrow
more if they could. Interestingly, they further estimate that college drop out rates (by the
beginning of year two) are about 13 percentage points higher (or roughly double) for those
youth deemed to be `constrained' relative to those that are not. Adjusting for other po-
tential factors reduces this di®erence to about 11 percentage points. While factors other
than borrowing constraints explain more than 85% of the dropout rate at Berea College, the
inability to borrow appears as an important determinant for those that are constrained.
Brown, Scholz and Seshadri (2011) explicitly model intergenerational relationships and
derive a new way of identifying which youth may be a®ected by borrowing constraints.
Their model assumes that youth would be borrowing constrained if they did not receive
help from their parents. Parents are assumed to be able to borrow freely, but they cannot
write enforceable loan contracts with their children. While parents may make transfers to
their children due to altruism, they may not want to transfer enough resources to satisfy
the child's full demand for consumption and schooling at college ages. In this case, parents
would provide all transfers to their children when they are college-age, but children would still
invest less than the unconstrained optimal amount. By contrast, unconstrained families will
transfer enough resources to their children when they are young and will continue to make
transfers after their children leave school. These results suggest that one can distinguish
between `constrained' youth and `unconstrained' youth based on the presence of post-school
17parental transfers. Brown, Scholz and Seshadri further show that in their framework, total
human capital investment should be more sensitive to a tuition subsidy among constrained
youth than among unconstrained youth.18
Based on these insights, Brown, Scholz and Seshadri (2011) use intergenerational data on
educational attainment and family transfers from the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS)
to estimate the e®ects of borrowing constraints on schooling in the U.S. during the 1970s,
1980s, and 1990s. Identifying `constrained' youth as those receiving no post-school family
transfers, they ¯nd that roughly 50% of all youth in their sample are `borrowing constrained'.
Because the HRS do not contain information on educational subsidies/aid, they use sibling
spacing as an instrument for student aid. Families with multiple children in college at the
same time generally qualify for more aid than families with children attending at di®erent
times. Their estimates suggest that among `constrained' youth, an additional $3,600 in aid
(associated with having a twin in college at the same time vs. no sibling overlap in college)
increases average schooling levels by 0.2 years. They estimate negligible e®ects of additional
aid on those youth who are `unconstrained' by their measure.
3.5 Summarizing the Evidence
For the most part, there is general agreement regarding the extent to which borrowing
constraints a®ect college decisions. Most studies analyzing the NLSY79 data ¯nd little
evidence that borrowing constraints a®ected college-going in the early 1980s. However, the
evidence suggests that constraints have become more salient in recent years: the rising costs
of and returns to college, coupled with stable real government student loan limits, are the
likely cause for stronger family income { college attendance gradients among recent cohorts.
Borrowing constraints a®ect more than college attendance. For example, they can a®ect
the quality of school attended. Family income has become a more important determinant
of attendance at four-year (relative to two-year) schools, while it has become less important
18As Carneiro and Heckman (2002) discuss, this result does not necessarily generalize to other models of
schooling choice. It is particularly di±cult to derive strong predictions on `tuition sensitivity' in models with
discrete schooling choices. For example, consider the college attendance choice. Even if tuition has a large
e®ect on the value of college for constrained individuals, it is possible that very few constrained youth are
near the margin of indi®erence. By contrast, even small changes in the value of college among unconstrained
youth may cause many to change their attendance decision if they are all largely indi®erent.
18for attendance at very selective institutions. Borrowing constraints could also delay college
attendance, but the evidence suggests little impact on this margin. Instead, constrained
students appear to work more while in school than those that are unconstrained. In recent
years, this distortion appears to have become more important for higher ability youth. Lastly,
there is widespread agreement that consumption is quite low for constrained youth enrolled
in college.
4 Early Investments in Children
Despite evidence that adolescent skill levels are important in determining subsequent school-
ing and lifetime earnings (see, e.g., Cameron and Heckman 1998, Keane and Wolpin 1997,
2001, and Carneiro and Heckman 2002), only recently has the literature begun to examine
the impacts of borrowing constraints on early investments in young children.
Indirect evidence suggests that constraints at early ages play a more important role in
determining human capital investment than constraints at later ages. First, most empiri-
cal studies ¯nd high lifetime returns for early childhood programs, especially for the most
disadvantaged children (e.g., see Karoly et al. 1998, Blau and Currie 2006, or Cunha, et al.
2006). Second, empirical studies ¯nd that family income received at early childhood ages
has a greater impact on achievement and educational attainment when compared with in-
come received at later ages (e.g. Duncan and Brooks-Gunn 1997, Duncan, et al. 1998, Levy
and Duncan 1999, Caucutt and Lochner 2006, 2011). More generally, recent studies show
that exogenous increases in family income lead to improvements in early child development
(e.g. L¿ken 2010, L¿ken, Mogstad and Wiswall 2010, Duncan, Morris and Rodrigues 2011,
Milligan and Stabile 2011, and Dahl and Lochner, forthcoming).
Credit constraints are natural candidates to explain why most low-income children do
not participate in quality preschool programs despite the high economic returns. First,
while (generous) government student loan programs are available for college in the U.S.
and other developed countries, neither governments nor private lenders typically o®er loans
to parents to help ¯nance human capital investments in younger children. Second, even
though elementary and secondary education is publicly provided, the quality of public schools
19available to poor American families is often low, while high quality private schools and
preschool programs are typically quite expensive. Parental time is also an important input
in a young child's education that poor parents may be unable to a®ord. Finally, most parents
of young children are young themselves, in the early stages of their labor market careers and
without a solid credit history. Even young college-educated parents may be constrained by
mortgages, their own schooling loans, and other liabilities.
To better understand the role of borrowing constraints at early and late childhood ages, it
is useful to generalize the human capital production function in Section 2 to include multiple
periods of investment. For simplicity, suppose human capital upon labor market entry H
depends on early childhood investment h1, adolescent investment h2, and ability a:
H = af(h1;h2): (9)
As discussed in Cunha, et al. (2006) and Cunha and Heckman (2007), the dynamic com-
plementarity between early and late investments (as measured by
@2f
@h1@h2 or the elasticity of
substitution) is crucial for the accumulation of human capital over the lifecycle. With strong
complementarity, it is di±cult to compensate for a lack of early investment at later ages. In
this case, inadequate early investments lead to low returns in later investments, consistent
with Keane and Wolpin (2001) and Cameron and Heckman (1998) who ¯nd small returns
to higher education for those with low adolescent skills. Caucutt and Lochner (2011) also
show that when h1 and h2 are su±ciently substitutable, relaxing the borrowing constraint in
either investment period increases investment in that period but reduces investment in the
other; when h1 and h2 are strong complements, relaxing borrowing limits in either period
increases investment in both periods.
The estimates of Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach (2010) suggest that investments are
quite complementary over time, with the degree of complementarity growing with age for
cognitive skills.19 They ¯nd that it is optimal to invest relatively more in young children
with investment declining with age. This is particularly true for children with low initial
endowments. This optimal path of declining investment contrasts sharply with the typical
19Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach (2010) estimate elasticities of substitution ranging from 0.4 to 1.5.
They use data from the Children of the NLSY and exploit a dynamic non-linear factor structure and multiple
measurements for cognitive and non-cognitive skills and family investments.
20pattern of increasing parental earnings over the lifecycle. To the extent that borrowing
constraints limit early investments in some children, those early de¯cits are likely to be
compounded over time.
Caucutt and Lochner develop and calibrate a dynastic overlapping-generations model to
quantitatively assess the importance of borrowing constraints and policy interventions over
di®erent stages (`early' and `late') of child development.20 They consider four levels of `late'
human capital investment, corresponding to high school dropout, high school completion,
some college, and college completion, calibrating their model using intergenerational mi-
cro data from the Children of the NLSY and national data on schooling expenditures and
revenues for the U.S. Despite their very di®erent approach, they identify a similar degree
of complementarity between early and late human capital investment to that estimated by
Cunha, Heckman and Schennach (2010).
Caucutt and Lochner ¯nd that many young and old parents are borrowing constrained,
especially those with higher education who took out loans to ¯nance their own education
and who tend to have high ability children. However, like Keane and Wolpin (2001) and
Johnson (2010), their model suggests that there would be little impact on human capital
investment (`early' or `late') from relaxing borrowing constraints on college-age youth or their
parents. At least in the short-run, relaxing constraints on young parents would substantially
increase both `early' investments in young children and `late' investments in older children
(e.g. high school completion and college). For example, they ¯nd that a modest increase in
the borrowing limit faced by young parents would increase early investment by about 8% and
college graduation rates by 7%. Interestingly, the e®ects are greater for families with more
educated parents, since these families are constrained and want more credit for investment
in their children. Less educated parents appear to want more credit primarily for current
consumption.
Caucutt and Lochner also explore the long-run impacts of permanently relaxing borrow-
ing constraints, allowing the distribution of assets and human capital to change in response.
Here, the results are quite di®erent. Since relaxing the borrowing constraint for young par-
20Restuccia and Urrutia (2004) also calibrate a dynastic model of human capital production with early
and late investments; however, they abstract from borrowing and saving. We discuss this work in Section 5.
21ents causes families to accumulate more debt over time, future generations ¯nd themselves
constrained to nearly the same extent that initial generations were before the constraint was
relaxed. On average, this shift in assets results in negligible long-run e®ects of relaxing the
constraint on average human capital levels. Modest increases can be a double-edged sword,
increasing human capital in the short-run but lowering family assets in the long-run.21
Finally, Caucutt and Lochner obtain two interesting results on the impact of subsidies for
`early' vs. `late' investment. First, subsidies for investment at either stage raise investments
at both stages, calling into question traditional analyses of policies targeting college-age that
ignore the response of early investment; this omission would cause one to under-estimate the
¯nal impact on human capital levels by about 75%. Second, they ¯nd that subsidies for early
investment produce much greater short- and long-run gains in human capital than (¯scally
equivalent) subsidies for late investment. Dynamic complementarity implies that families
that are constrained when their children are young do not fully capitalize on subsidies at
later ages, because it is too costly to adjust early investments. Those that receive inadequate
early investments do not ¯nd it worthwhile to make additional later investments (especially
college) even if it is heavily subsidized. By contrast, early investment subsidies enable families
to increase investments in their young children without sacri¯cing current consumption or
borrowing more. Those investments can then be matched with later investments when
constraints are less severe.
5 Macroeconomic Perspectives
By shaping the capacity and the incentives of individuals to invest in their own human
capital and that of their children, credit constraints become a major determinant of social
(intergenerational) mobility and of the overall distribution of skills, income and wealth in a
country. Unlike the micro empirical literature discussed in Section 3, the macro literature
has largely considered `intergenerational' constraints arising from the inability of parents to
borrow against their children's future earnings.
21Of course, welfare of the dynasty is improved by relaxing the constraint; however, initial generations
capture most of this gain.
225.1 Inequality and Persistence of Skills and Income
Becker and Tomes (1979, 1986) and Loury (1981) pioneered the development of fully con-
sistent economic models of the income distribution based on intergenerational transfers and
investments in human capital. These papers show how an economy's income distribution is
endogenously determined by preferences and market opportunities. Credit constraints play
a central role in that they limit the capacity of poor parents to invest in their children.
In these models, human capital for generation t, Ht, depends on the investments, ht,
and ability, at, for that generation: Ht = f(at;ht). It may also depend on shocks to the
production of human capital as well as the human capital of one's parents Ht¡1. Ability
is typically assumed to follow a ¯rst order Markov process across generations, and earnings
generally depend on human capital levels, independent idiosyncratic market shocks, and the
economy-wide price of human capital.
Three types of intergenerational preferences are commonly assumed in this literature.
`Altruistic' preferences assume that parents directly value the welfare of their children. Par-
ents of generation t value their own consumption and the utility of their future generations
according to the recursive value function Vt = u(ct) + ¯Et (Vt+1), where u(ct) is the utility
of consumption of the family at time t, ¯ > 0 is an altruism parameter re°ecting the weight
placed on children, and Et (Vt+1) is the expected utility for children in the next period. A
closely related form of `impure' altruism may arise when parents live for two or more periods:
Vt = u(ct) + ¯ [u(ct+1) + µEt (Vt+1)] with ¯ > 0 re°ecting time discounting and µ ¸ 0 the
degree of intergenerational altruism. Altruism is said to be `impure' when µ < 1. Notice
that Vt are value functions that must satisfy a recursive relationship, a ¯xed point problem
de¯ned by a Bellman equation. This is not the case for the other two form of preference as-
sumed in the literature. `Paternalistic' preferences assume that parents directly value human
capital investments, human capital outcomes, or even earnings, e.g. Vt = u(ct)+EtU (ht+1).
`Warm-glow' preferences assume that parents directly value any transfers/bequests bt made
to their children: Vt = u(ct)+U (bt). In this case, it does not matter what children do with
the money.
Early theoretical papers by Becker and Tomes (1979) and Loury (1981) assume parents
23invest in their children's human capital while ruling out intergenerational ¯nancial transfers.
Becker and Tomes (1979) assume `paternalistic' preferences over child income, while Loury
assumes a very general form of altruism. These papers derive useful conditions that ensure
that the economy converges to a unique invariant income (and skill) distribution that depends
on preferences and technology. Importantly, the economy is `ergodic' in the sense that the
impact of the initial conditions for a dynasty progressively washes out with the passing of
time. After many generations, the income levels of all dynasties tend to exactly the same
distribution as that for the economy as a whole. There tends to be `regression to the mean' in
the sense that richer (poorer) than average parents tend to have richer (poorer) than average
children, but the gaps tend to close over time. Becker and Tomes (1979) show how social
mobility is driven by intergenerational persistence in ability, the variance of labor market
shocks, and the extent to which parents value the income of their children. In Loury (1981)
a positive intergenerational persistence in income arises even when ability is not correlated
across generations.
Becker and Tomes (1986) extend their earlier analysis to incorporate complementarity
between ability and investment in the production of human capital, non-negative parent-to-
child ¯nancial transfers, and altruistic preferences. They show that constrained families will
not leave ¯nancial bequests; instead, all their transfers will be in the form of human capital
investment. Moreover, they suggest that the relationship between ability and investment
might be negative for constrained families. Beyond these lessons, the aggregate implications
of models like this can only be examined numerically.
A few more recent studies consider the implications of indivisibilities in human capital
investment (e.g. Galor and Zeira 1993, Caucutt and Kumar 2003, Restuccia and Urrutia
2004). Galor and Zeira (1993) study the determination of the income distribution when hu-
man capital investments consist of a single discrete choice: whether or not to attend college.
They assume warm-glow preferences and abstract from individual shocks to earnings, abili-
ties, and human capital production. In the presence of credit market imperfections (modelled
as a positive gap between borrowing and lending interest rates), Galor and Zeira show that
non-convexities can greatly a®ect the long-run determination of the income distribution. In
particular, they show that there can be multiple steady states (potentially in¯nitely many)
24that fall into three categories: (i) global poverty traps (the entire population is unschooled),
(ii) a perfect caste system with \individual poverty traps" where some dynasties are forever
unschooled while the others are forever schooled; or (iii) a fully developed country/skilled
population equilibrium if the initial capital is high enough and everyone is above some thresh-
old. Which long-run steady states arise depends entirely on the initial distribution of skills,
a sharp contrast with the ergodicity in Loury (1981) and Becker and Tomes (1979).
The non-convexity in schooling choices also produces very di®erent predictions for social
mobility (compared to the earlier studies). Galor and Zeira (1993) show that, in the limit,
their model produces zero social mobility (i.e. in¯nite persistence in family status) in all
steady state types. The lack of ergodicity is likely to hold even with ability shocks, as
long as abilities are always high enough so that rich individuals always ¯nd it worthwhile
to invest in college. One way to induce ergodicity is to introduce large (and uninsured)
post-investment income shocks that consistently move dynasties away from the attraction
of `unschooled' and `schooled' resting points. If so, unschooled rich (impoverished poor)
parents may (not) transfer enough resources for the child to go to school.
Assumptions about the form of intergenerational preferences also have important con-
sequences. For example, taxes that transfer resources from rich to poor dynasties reduce
average human capital levels when parents are paternalistic as in Becker and Tomes (1979)
while they increase human capital with warm-glow preferences as in Galor and Zeira (1993).
Implications of impure altruism are studied by Aiyagari, Greenwood and Seshadri (2002).
Their numerical exercises suggest important general equilibrium interactions between impure
altruism and credit constraints with incomplete insurance markets. Most notably, a higher
stock of physical capital can lead to higher steady state levels of human capital when parents
are less than perfectly altruistic towards their children.
In addition to Aiyagari, Greenwood and Seshadri (2002), Caucutt and Kumar (2003)
provide an important dynastic framework for quantitatively studying the formation of human
capital and the evolution of earnings across generations. They assume altruistic preferences, a
form of persistence in schooling, and lumpy human capital investments with uncertain payo®s
(i.e. students may fail to complete school). By ruling out ¯nancial transfers, they impose
intergenerational credit constraints. As in most of this literature, Caucutt and Kumar assume
25that families cannot insure against the di®erent risks they face, including the possibility of
school failure (which depends on ability) and uncertainty in the ability levels of grandchildren
and subsequent generations.
Caucutt and Kumar (2003) ¯nd similar types of steady states to those of Galor and Zeira
(1993). Global or individual poverty traps arise (even with altruistic preferences) due to
indivisibilities in human capital investment. With their preferred calibration, their relatively
simple model captures the share of college educated workers, the college wage premium, and
the enrollment and dropout rates of children conditional on parental education as observed
in the U.S.22 To ¯t intergenerational schooling relationships in the data, it is important that
they allow parental education to directly enter the production of children's human capital
(i.e. graduation probabilities are higher for those whose parents completed college).
Restuccia and Urrutia (2004) extend the dynastic framework of Caucutt and Kumar
(2003) to include a period of early investment in children along with a college attendance de-
cision at later ages. Early investments (and innate abilities) are assumed to increase earnings
associated with college attendance as well as the likelihood of ¯nishing college. Borrowing
and saving, as well as intergenerational ¯nancial transfers, are ruled out. Families must con-
sume and make investments out of current incomes. Calibrating their model to U.S. data,
they argue that di®erences in early investments by parental income are largely responsible
for observed levels of intergenerational persistence, since the lack of credit availability is
particularly problematic for poor young parents (for reasons discussed in Section 4).
5.2 Government Policies
In general, human capital investments are more e±cient if done earlier in life. Therefore,
if credit constraints limit the ability of younger generations to invest, aggregate output will
su®er. Under these circumstances, private market allocations are ine±cient, and government
programs that transfer resources from older to younger generations could increase overall
welfare. Unfortunately, such transfer schemes may not be politically implementable, because
they entail a net loss for older generations.
22It is worth noting, however, that Caucutt and Kumar (2003) present numerical examples in which
changes in the value of the coe±cient of relative risk aversion or in the cost of college lead to qualitatively
di®erent sets of steady states.
26As discussed by Boldrin and Montes (2004), intergenerational con°ict can be averted
if public schooling policies are tied to other government transfers. Speci¯cally, (mid-aged)
workers could be taxed to help ¯nance the human capital of youth and the pensions of re-
tirees. This simple point of Boldrin and Montes' | linking government human capital policies
with other transfer programs to improve upon allocations | seems robust to much richer
environments than their three-period deterministic overlapping-generations model with rep-
resentative generations and exogenous credit constraints. A secondary result of their analysis,
namely the ability of the government to fully restore e±ciency with simple (homogeneous)
policies, is much more fragile. Still, it provides a useful reference point for discussing three
key limitations in the design of government policies: (i) heterogeneity; (ii) endogeneity of
private credit constraints; and (iii) risks and incentive problems.
Heteregeneity in abilities and family resources can be a major limitation for the e±cacy of
government programs. Merit-based programs may be imprecise in di®erentiating by ability,
especially at younger ages when investments may have high returns and credit constraints
may be most severe. Need-based programs may be more precisely targeted, but they may
lead to ine±cient over-investment by lower ability individuals. The implications of these and
other forms of government policies are studied by Caucutt and Kumar (2003), Restuccia and
Urrutia and (2004) and Hanushek, Leung and Yilmaz (2003).
Caucutt and Kumar (2003) explore a number of policies in the form of subsidies/earnings
taxes: (i) need-based policies that seek equality of opportunity; (ii) policies that maximize
the (steady state) fraction of college educated; and (iii) merit-based subsidies. Caucutt
and Kumar compare the implications of these policies (relative to the laissez faire) on two
measures: (a) welfare (steady state and with transition dynamics) and (b) e±ciency of the
schooling sector (number of successful graduates relative to the resources used in education).
Overall, their results are relatively pessimistic about the bene¯ts of further government sub-
sidies. Policy types (i) and (ii) lead to negligible welfare gains and reductions in the resource
e±ciency of schooling. Type (iii) policies improve school e±ciency but reduce average wel-
fare. Hanushek, Leung and Yilmaz (2003) are also skeptical about the bene¯cial e®ects of
educational subsidies, arguing instead that wage subsidies dominate in most regards.
Enriching the analysis with early investments signi¯cantly changes the implications for
27government policies. Restuccia and Urrutia (2004) ¯nd that increasing government fund-
ing for early schooling substantially increases social mobility (i.e. reduces intergenerational
persistence), aggregate human capital, consumption and output. By contrast, increasing
subsidies to college (late) education has negligible e®ects on social mobility and produces
smaller increases in aggregate human capital, output, and consumption. Moreover, while
this policy increases enrollment rates, it also increases dropout rates, reducing the e±ciency
of the college sector.
Incorporating early investment essentially endogenizes the formation of | and hetero-
geneity in | ability. This essentially moves these dynastic human capital models closer to
the simpler homogeneous agents model of Boldrin and Montes (2004). Indeed, Restuccia
and Urrutia (2004) report that calibrating their model without early education requires a
much greater exogenous dispersion in innate abilities.
The endogenous response of private market arrangements is another major consideration
for the analysis of government policies that is typically neglected. As we stress in the
next section, credit constraints arise from repayment incentive problems and institutional
features of the economy. These incentive problems are a®ected by taxes and subsidies that
governments impose on the di®erent actions and outcomes of individuals. Indeed, Andolfatto
and Gervais (2006) show that the analysis of Boldrin and Montes (2004) may not be robust
when credit constraints are endogenously driven by limited commitment. In this case, the
pension transfers advocated by Boldrin and Montes would reduce the cost of default and
repayment incentives. The net e®ect can be a lower | not higher | supply of resources for
youth to invest in human capital.23
Finally, the risky nature of human capital can give rise to many incentive problems,
including imperfect observability and moral hazard during and after school. Much of the
research on human capital has yet to incorporate lessons from the literature on optimal
contracts with dynamic incentive problems. We discuss some of these issues in Section 6.
23Yang (2011) further examines the conditions under which full e±ciency can be restored with endogenous
credit constraints.
285.3 Cross-Country Di®erences in Schooling
It is useful to look beyond the U.S. | the focus of this article | to appreciate the macroe-
conomic consequences of credit constraints in human capital formation. A large literature
examines cross-country di®erences in income and educational attainment; yet, most of this
literature abstracts from borrowing constraints entirely.24
Recent work by Cordoba and Ripoll (2011) shows that introducing credit constraints
signi¯cantly improves the ability of a Ben-Porath (1967) model to explain the cross-country
variation in the average years of schooling and the gap between the returns to schooling
and the returns on riskless assets. Interestingly, they show that intergenerational constraints
and lifecycle borrowing constraints for students yield similar implications. Contrary to a
frictionless model, the model of Cordoba and Ripoll implies that parental lifetime income,
family size, and the supply of public education are important determinants of education in-
vestments. A calibration of their model with low discount rates does a good job of explaining
the observed data on educational attainment.
Cordoba and Ripoll (2011) assume exogenous constraints on credit that are uniform
across countries. Exploring cross-country di®erences in access to credit would likely lead
to interesting insights, given the evidence (e.g. Filmer and Pritchett 1999) on large cross-
country dispersion in the e®ect of household wealth on educational attainment in developing
countries. Moreover, models with endogenous constraints would not only capture the direct
impact of di®erent institutions and policies on human capital, but they would also incorpo-
rate additional e®ects due to responses in credit.
6 The Nature of Borrowing Constraints for Education
Despite all the attention paid to credit constraints in the market for human capital, little
attention has been paid to the nature of those constraints, i.e. the underlying institutions
and incentive problems associated with credit to young individuals with little collateral to
pledge while in school. Instead, nearly all studies, theoretical and empirical, assume that
24See, e.g., Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992), Klenow and Rodriguez (1997), Bils and Klenow (2000),
Kaboski (2007), Manuelli and Seshadri (2010).
29individuals face limits on borrowing as in Section 2 or arbitrary di®erences in interest rates
based on family income. Such simple assumptions are at odds with the actual operation of
public and private sources of credit for education.
This section shows that more realistic assumptions about public and private lending
can be useful in understanding the behavior of human capital investments, altering key
predictions discussed in Section 2.1. We begin by discussing individual behavior when future
incomes are certain, then introduce uncertainty about returns on human capital investment.
6.1 Government Student Loans and Limited Commitment
As discussed in Lochner and Monge-Naranjo (2011b), government student loan (GSL) pro-
grams explicitly link credit to educational expenditures, while private lenders extend credit
to students based on their prospects of repayment and projected future earnings. The follow-
ing discussion borrows heavily from their analysis. We use the same notation and preferences
as in Section 2.1; however, we consider di®erent constraints on borrowing that incorporate
central features of existing GSL programs and private lending available for higher education.
GSL programs. Lending programs supported by the federal U.S. government generally
have three salient features. First, lending is directly tied to investment. Students (or parents)
can only borrow up to the total cost of college (including tuition, room, board, books, and
other expenses directly related to schooling) less any other ¯nancial aid they receive in the
form of grants or scholarships. Thus, GSL programs do not ¯nance non-schooling related
consumption expenses. Second, GSL programs set upper loan limits on the total amount
of credit available for each student. Third, loans covered by GSL programs typically have
extended enforcement rules compared to unsecured private loans.
To capture these key features of GSL programs, Lochner and Monge-Naranjo (2011b)
assume that individuals face two constraints on government loans. First, lending is tied
to investment and cannot be used to ¯nance non-schooling related consumption goods or
activities, so government borrowing dg must satisfy dg · ¿h.25 They refer to this as the
tied-to-investment constraint (TIC). Second, GSL borrowing is constrained by a ¯xed upper
25In the U.S., GSL programs do not allow for borrowing against foregone earnings costs; however, they do
allow for borrowing against certain `living expenses' (e.g. room and board).
30limit dg < ¹ d like the exogenous limit of Section 2. Combining these two constraints yields






For now, we assume that GSL repayment is fully enforced. In the next section, we discuss
models with default.26
Private Lending. Students have increasingly turned to private lending markets to ¯nance
their schooling: private student loan amounts skyrocketed from $1.3 billion in 1995-96 to
almost $14 billion in 2004-05 (nearly 20 percent of all student loan dollars distributed).
Credit card debt among students also rose considerably over this period (College Board
2005).
Private lenders possess weaker enforcement mechanisms than the government to ensure
repayment of loans. Indeed, this is the central justi¯cation for assuming credit market im-
perfections in the education sector (Becker 1967). In modeling private lending, Lochner and
Monge-Naranjo (2011b) build on recent work on credit constraints that arise endogenously
when lenders have limited mechanisms for enforcing repayment.27 A rational borrower repays
private loans if and only if repaying is less costly than defaulting. These limited incentives
can be foreseen by rational lenders who, in response, limit their supply of credit to amounts
that will be repaid.28 Since penalties for default typically impose a larger monetary cost
on borrowers with higher earnings and assets | only so much can be taken from someone
with little to take | credit o®ered to an individual is directly related to his perceived fu-
ture earnings. Because expected earnings are determined by ability and investment, private
credit limits and investments are co-determined in equilibrium.
It is possible to derive a simple private lending constraint by assuming that defaulting
borrowers lose a fraction 0 < ~ · < 1 of labor earnings.29 In this case, borrowers repay if and
26In practice, default rates have hovered around 5-10% over the past 15 years.
27The literature on endogenous credit constraints has mostly focused on risk-sharing and asset prices in
endowment economies (e.g. Alvarez and Jermann 2000, Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger 2004, Krueger
and Perri 2002, Kehoe and Levine 1993, and Kocherlakota 1996) or ¯rm dynamics (e.g. Albuquerque and
Hopenhayn 2004, Monge-Naranjo 2009). We assume punishments for default that are similar to those in
Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt (2007) and Chatterjee, et al. (2007) in their analyses of bankruptcy.
28Gropp, Scholz, and White (1997) empirically support this form of response by private lenders.
29This is consistent with wage garnishments and costly penalty avoidance actions like re-locating, working
in the informal economy, borrowing from loan sharks, or renting instead of buying a home.
31only if the payment Rdp is less than the punishment cost ~ ·af(h). As a result, credit from
private lenders is limited to a fraction of post-school earnings:
dp · ~ ·R
¡1af (h). (11)
Private credit is directly increasing in both ability and investment. Moreover, ability may
also indirectly a®ect credit through its in°uence on investment.
Students can borrow dg from the GSL (subject to (10)) and dp from private lenders
(subject to (11)). Because GSL repayments are fully enforced and do not a®ect incentives
to repay private loans, total borrowing is constrained by






In this simple framework, government credit does not crowd out private credit. Lochner and
Monge-Naranjo (2011b) show that in a similar lifecycle model that includes both temporary
exclusion from credit markets and wage garnishments as punishments for default, there will
be partial crowd out of private credit with expansions in GSL credit. Crowd out occurs,
because increases in GSL debt lower incentives to repay private debt.
Empirical Implications. This framework can explain four important empirical patterns
in the U.S. over the past few decades: (1) Schooling is strongly positively correlated with
ability over time. (2) The correlation between schooling and family income (conditional
on ability and family background) has grown since the early 1980s. (3) There has been a
sharp increase in the fraction of undergraduates borrowing the maximum amount from GSL
programs since the 1990 (Berkner 2000 and Titus 2002). (4) There has been a dramatic rise
in student borrowing from private lenders since the mid-1990s (College Board 2005).
As noted in Section 2.1, the standard `exogenous' constraints model predicts that con-
strained human capital investment is decreasing in ability for constrained individuals under
empirically relevant assumptions about preferences for consumption smoothing. Because
GSL programs and private lenders link credit to individual ability and investments in hu-
man capital, explicitly modeling these endogenous constraints produces a stronger positive
relationship between ability and investment for constrained individuals. In contrast to the
prediction of the exogenous constraint model of Section 2.1, if ~ · is large enough so that
32private credit is su±ciently increasing in future earnings, more able individuals may be
unconstrained while the least able are constrained (given any level of family resources W).
Calibrating their lifecycle model to the U.S. in the early 1980s, Lochner and Monge-
Naranjo show that patterns (2)-(4) can be explained as equilibrium responses to the observed
increase in the returns to and costs of college since the early 1980s (given stable GSL limits).
Their quantitative analysis suggests that in the early 1980s, the GSL provided adequate
credit so that few students would have needed to turn to private creditors. College attendance
was, therefore, largely independent of family resources. The rising college costs and returns
over time have encouraged more recent students to invest and borrow more, with many
exhausting their GSL loans and borrowing substantially from private lenders. Although
private lenders have responded to increases in schooling (and its return) by o®ering more
credit, their results suggest that many students with low family resources are now constrained
and unable to invest as much as they would like.
The fact that GSL and private credit limits are linked to investment shifts the distor-
tionary e®ects of credit constraints onto consumption and away from investment. In fact,
Lochner and Monge-Naranjo show that credit constrained individuals may not under-invest
in human capital. When private loans are unavailable, students constrained only by the
GSL's TIC always invest the unconstrained optimal amount | only consumption pro¯les
are a®ected. When both public and private loans are available, poor low ability youth may
actually over-invest in human capital.30
Lochner and Monge-Naranjo analyze a number of policy issues that cannot be studied
without explicitly endogenizing access to credit. For instance, their framework lends itself
naturally to an analysis of the interaction between private credit and GSL programs and
other government policies. Simulations suggest that expansions of public credit have only
modest crowd out e®ects on private lending. Increases in GSL limits lead to higher levels of
total credit and raise human capital investment among youth constrained by those limits.
30Abstracting from foregone earnings, when only the GSL's TIC binds, additional investments (at the
margin) can be ¯nanced fully from the GSL. Further, increases in investment expand private credit that
can be used to augment current consumption. While over-investment is theoretically possible, Lochner and
Monge-Naranjo's quantitative analysis indicates that it is not empirically relevant given relatively low current
GSL limits.
33Additionally, they show that changes in GSL credit tend to have a relatively greater impact
on investment among the least able, while changes in private loan enforcement tend to impact
investment more among the most able. Not all forms of credit expansion are the same.
Finally, endogenous borrowing constraints make human capital investment more sensitive
to government education subsidies. Any policy that encourages investment is met with an
increase in access to credit, which further encourages the investment of constrained students.
This `credit expansion e®ect', absent with ¯xed constraints, can be quite large. Results in
Lochner and Monge-Naranjo (2011b) suggest that investment responds as much as 50% more
than in the exogenous constraint model.
6.2 Uncertainty, Default and Other Incentive Problems
A simple model with limited commitment captures interesting responses to individual charac-
teristics and investments. However, other important incentive problems cannot be captured
unless uncertainty or risk are introduced. We now add uncertainty to the model of Section
2.1 and discuss the implications of limited insurance and private information for the pro-
vision of credit and human capital investment behavior. We show how incorporating ideas
from the literatures on optimal contracting with limited commitment, private information,
and moral hazard can be helpful for understanding schooling, borrowing, and repayment
decisions. Furthermore, this analysis provides useful guidance in designing e±cient poli-
cies to provide both credit and insurance for youth making schooling decisions in a risky
environment. See Lochner and Monge-Naranjo (2011a) for a more detailed analysis.
For simplicity, we abstract from forgone wages and normalize tuition costs to one (i.e.
w0 = 0 and ¿ = 1). Assume now that the second period price of human capital is stochastic
and can take on i = 1;:::;N possible realizations. Let pi > 0 denote the probability of
realization w1;i which we order so that w1;1 < w1;2 < ::: < w1;N. Assume that the individual
and potential lenders observe the true probabilities as well as individual ability a and initial
assets W. Individuals maximize expected utility




where c1;i is the second period consumption in realization i.
34Let Di be the (possibly negative) quantity that a person commits to repay in the second
period, possibly contingent on the realization i. The budget constraints are




c1;i = af (h)w1;i ¡ Di, i = 1;:::;N.
Here, qi is the (Arrow) price of a contingent claim that pays 1 if realization i takes place and
zero otherwise. For cases with complete markets, we follow the standard assumption of risk
neutral, arbitrage-free asset prices, i.e. qi = ¯pi.
Unrestricted optima. A complete markets environment has the same separation property
as the basic model in Section 2.1. First, human capital investments hU (a) maximize the
expected net present value of lifetime income by equating the marginal cost of investing








where ¹ w1 ´
PN
i=1 piw1;i is the expected period 1 price of skill. Neither preferences nor initial
wealth W have an e®ect on investment, because there are no restrictions on asset/debt
holdings and there is full insurance. Second, asset/debt holdings Di are set to optimally
smooth consumption over time and across states: u0 (c0) = u0 (c1;i), for all i = 1;:::;N.
Limited Commitment with Complete Markets. To introduce limited commitment, assume
that individuals can default on their debts in the second period. Doing so, they attain a
`default' utility of V D (w1;i;a;h), which would generally be increasing in the realization
w1;i and in ability a and human capital investments h. Foreseeing these `participation'
constraints, lenders limit debt obligations so that u[w1;iaf (h) ¡ Di] ¸ V D (w1i;a;h). This
limits the set of assets/debts individuals can hold as well as their ability to insure against
some future states.
Letting ¸i ¸ 0 denote the (discounted) multiplier on participation constraint i = 1;:::;N,
optimal debt holdings satisfy u0 (c0) = (1 + ¸i)u0 (c1;i). For states w1;i in which the partici-
pation constraint does not bind (¸i = 0), there is perfect consumption smoothing, c1;i = c0.
However, if either a is high and/or W is low, the participation constraint may bind for some
states, in which case we should observe positive consumption growth, c1;i > c0.
35To explore the implications for human capital accumulation, we now focus exclusively on
the case in which a borrower who defaults is penalized by forfeiting a fraction ~ · 2 [0;1] of
his earnings. This implies V D (w1i;a;h) = u[(1 ¡ ~ ·)w1iaf (h)], so participation constraints
reduce to simple `solvency' constraints of the form Di · ~ ·w1;iaf (h) for all i = 1;:::;N.
To ensure repayment, the debts carried into any state cannot exceed the income forfeiture.
Solvency constraints bind for high realizations of w1;i, in which case repayments equal Di =
~ ·w1iaf0 (h). There is perfect smoothing across low earnings states but only limited insurance


















When all ¸i = 0, the unrestricted allocation is attained. Whenever at least one `sol-







< ¹ w1 when 0 < ~ · < 1 and ¸i > 0 for some i.
Other implications for investment are also similar to those discussed earlier in the model
with perfect certainty. For example, human capital investments help relax solvency con-
straints in both models. Here, a marginal unit invested increases next period consumption
by w1iaf0 (h) units if the individual repays, while it only yields (1 ¡ ~ ·)w1iaf0 (h) units if the
person were to default. This encourages investment and implies a `credit expansion' response
to education policies as discussed earlier. Furthermore, default does not occur in equilibrium,
since all debt repayments are contingent on future states. With such rich contracts, optimal
institutional arrangements would minimize the temptation of default by raising ~ · as high as
possible (~ · = 1), in which case the economy attains the unconstrained optimal allocation.
Limited commitment with incomplete markets. We now take the opposite extreme from
fully contingent contracts and assume that second period liabilities cannot depend on the
state, w1;i. Because of the incompleteness of contracts, default may now occur in equilib-
rium. We assume that punishments for default take the same form of a proportional income
forfeiture ~ ·w1;iaf (h), which is recovered by lenders.
Let D > 0 be the amount of debt individuals `promise' to repay after school. Of course,
31Compared with a simple income-contingent repayment scheme in which individuals always repay a
constant fraction of their income, these allocations provide greater insurance in low income states.
36individuals will actually repay if and only if D · ~ ·w1;iaf (h). This de¯nes the threshold for
w1;i, ~ w1 (D;a;h) ´ D
~ ·af(h), below which an individual defaults. The probability of default,
Pr[w1;i < ~ w1 (D;a;h)], is weakly increasing in the level of debt D and decreasing in ability
a and human capital h. In exchange for a promise to pay D > 0, risk-neutral lenders would













From the full repayment D, this expression substracts the expected losses D ¡ ~ ·w1;iaf (h)
from defaulting loans. Expected payments, Q(D;a;h), are not monotonically increasing in
debt, since increasing debt can more than proportionally reduce the probability of repay-
ment.32 A `hard' borrowing constraint is given by supD fQ(D;a;h)g < 1, the maximum
value a lender could possibly expect to extract from someone with ability a investing h.
For simplicity, assume that ~ w1 falls outside the support of w1;i and, therefore, ignore
jumps in the default probabilities.33 Under this assumption, marginal changes in D and
h do not a®ect the probability of default, and the necessary ¯rst order condition for D is
simply
u
0 (c0) = E[u
0 (c1;i)jw1;i ¸ ~ w1].
Optimal borrowing trades-o® the gains on consumption c0 with the costs on future consump-
tion only in higher income states of the world in which there is repayment. The necessary






















where Qh > 0 is the partial derivative (subgradient) of Q with respect to h and must
be strictly less than 1 at the optimum.34 This equation reveals three important di®erences
between investment here and under full insurance. First, additional investment increases
32As a function of D, only the increasing region of Q(¢;a;h) is relevant.
33See Lochner and Monge-Naranjo (2011a) for a complete analysis of the general case.
34For a saver, D < 0 and Q(D;a;h) = ¯D. Thus, Qh = 0 and QD = ¯.
37expected payments, thereby expanding credit. This `credit expansion' e®ect encourages
investment. Second, some bene¯ts of investment are lost in the event of default since 0 <
~ · < 1. This new e®ect arises only because of default and discourages investment. Third,
the lack of insurance implies a precautionary motive for investment; however, the riskiness
of human capital can also reduce investments as discussed in Krebs (2003).
The absence of repayment contingencies has a number of important consequences. First,
default can occur in equilibrium. Second, if default happens, it is for low realizations of w1;i
when earnings and consumption are low. Third, the option to default serves an insurance
role: given the same liabilities D, the consumption of borrowers would be even lower if
they had to fully repay. As a result, eliminating default may be ine±cient and could reduce
investment. The policy trade-o®s in this model are more interesting than in previous models.
Interest rates, implicitly given by R(D;a;h) ´ D=Q(D;a;h), contain a premium for the
possibility of default. Higher R(¢) must cover for states in which borrowers default. Ability
directly impacts interest rates and credit limits, since Qa > 0; for the same investments h
and credit amount Q, more able individuals are asked to repay less. This e®ect would lead
more able persons to invest further in human capital (especially since Qah > 0). Of course,
higher investments in human capital would be coupled with higher liabilities, which has
the potential to increase the probability of default. In ongoing work, Lochner and Monge-
Naranjo (2011a) explore the extent to which this type of model can reproduce observed
default rates by ability, debt, and post-school earnings.
Ionescu (2008, 2009, 2011) analyzes models similar to this in order to study college en-
rollment, borrowing, and default decisions when credit is provided by GSL programs. Her
results suggest that default rates are not higher among individuals that are most ¯nancially
constrained. Most interestingly, she considers the impact of repayment °exibility (e.g., lock-
in low interest rates, switching to income contingent repayments, or alternative bankruptcy
discharges) in calibrated versions of her models. Overall, she ¯nds that the degree to which
contingencies can be incorporated into repayment schemes can have signi¯cant e®ects on
schooling. Her analysis suggests that more than hard borrowing constraints, the lack of in-
surance can sometimes be the limiting factor for schooling decisions. This general conclusion
is consistent with the quantitative analysis of Krebs (2003) as well as the structural estimates
38of Johnson (2010).
Private Information and Limited Insurance. Conceptually, the lack of insurance assumed
above is better seen as arising from imperfect information. As such, it is natural to consider
some of the lessons and modeling approaches from the vast literature on optimal contracting
under private information.
First, consider ex-post asymmetric information. Lenders may not be able to o®er income
contingent repayments if they cannot observe the ex-post circumstances of a borrower. Yet,
when outcomes can be observed at a cost, the possibility of partial insurance arises. In this
case, it is natural to adapt the model of costly state veri¯cation (Townsend 1979) to our
human capital setting. This framework is appealing in that it replicates important features
of actual bankruptcy institutions as well as some features of income contingent student loan
programs.
If a cost must be incurred for lenders to observe the post-schooling earnings of a borrower,
the optimal contract is remarkably simple. For high realizations of w1;i, borrowers would
simply repay a ¯xed amount (avoiding any veri¯cation costs), while an audit would take place
for lower realizations. Observing the actual outcome (through veri¯cation), a risk-neutral
lender would provide a constant consumption level (i.e. full insurance) to the borrower in
`low' states of the world. Thus, the worst ex post outcomes would be fully insured against
(as opposed to partial insurance implicit in basic income-contingent loan programs.)
Given a uniform cost of veri¯cation, the fact that higher ability implies higher earnings
suggests that the probability of veri¯cation will be lower for more able individuals, while
their consumption is likely to be higher when veri¯cation occurs. Higher family resources
would imply lower leverage and, hence, a lower probability of veri¯cation. These e®ects on
the terms of insurance would tend to produce more positive ability { investment and family
resources { investment relationships.
Next, consider moral hazard problems in investment.35 Suppose that in addition to ob-
servable investment h, young individuals must exert unobservable costly e®ort that a®ects
post-schooling earnings (with higher returns to e®ort for more able individuals). It is well-
known that to induce e®ort, the degree of insurance must be reduced. This basic result
35See Chatterjee and Ionescu (2010) for a model with graduation failure with moral hazard.
39suggests important limits on credit programs. Some higher ability individuals may not ob-
tain adequate credit, because lenders foresee (correctly) the toll that high debts impose on
e®ort incentives. Still, more able individuals are likely to make greater observed investments
and unobserved e®ort in equilibrium.
Finally, consider post-schooling moral hazard problems. E®ort must be exerted to seek,
keep and improve one's job after school is over. If these e®orts are costly for the borrower
and unobserved by the creditor, a high debt may a®ect labor market outcomes. In turn,
those e®ects determine access to credit in the ¯rst place.
In the last two decades, an extensive literature on optimal unemployment insurance has
been developed (e.g. Hopenhayn and Nicolini, 1997, Acemoglu and Shimer, 1999 and Shimer
and Werning, 2008); however, this literature generally considers the welfare of workers once
human capital has been formed. Unfortunately, little is known about the joint design of
optimal policies that provide both access to credit for education and insurance against post-
schooling labor market uncertainty when moral hazard is a problem.
7 Conclusions
Our review of the evidence suggests that, in recent years, credit constraints have become more
important for higher education decisions in the U.S. The signi¯cant rise in the costs of and
returns to college have increased the demand for credit well beyond the supply available from
government programs. As such, the rapid expansion in private lending over the past ¯fteen
years should not come as a surprise. Providing credit for human capital, however, requires
repayment enforceability and raises other incentive problems. As in Lochner and Monge-
Naranjo (2011b), we have argued that explicitly incorporating these incentive problems in
models of human capital formation can help explain observed cross-sectional patterns and
shed new light on schooling responses to policies and economic changes.
The importance of credit constraints extends beyond their impacts on college-going.
Distortions in student consumption and leisure have been documented even during periods
when college outcomes were not (e.g. the early 1980s). More importantly, recent evidence
highlights the adverse impacts family borrowing constraints can have on early investments in
40children. There are good reasons to believe that these early constraints are more pervasive
and harmful than constraints at college ages. Recent work on the dynamic complementarity
in investments suggests that under-investment at early ages may explain why relaxing
constraints at later ages often has little impact. Instead, government policies targeting
younger ages can have much larger e®ects.
Credit constraints a®ect the degree of social mobility, the evolution of the income dis-
tribution, and aggregate output and overall welfare. Quantitative macro studies have been
successful in replicating important cross-sectional and intergenerational patterns in the data.
However, considerable work remains to incorporate dimensions of heterogeneity and the life-
cycle, as emphasized in the applied micro literature.
It is unfortunate that most of the human capital literature has ignored the vast literature
on optimal contracts with incentive constraints. We have shown how standard results in
this literature can be easily adapted to models of human capital formation, leading to new
insights on the way abilities and family resources a®ect investments in human capital and a
better understanding of how to best design government policies.
418 Summary Points
² Evidence suggests that borrowing constraints have become more severe for college
attendance in recent years.
² In addition to college attendance, borrowing constraints a®ect consumption and work/leisure
while in school.
² Evidence suggests borrowing constraints may be more salient for family investments
in younger children than at college ages.
² Early borrowing constraints and complementarity between early and late investments
suggest that policies aimed at earlier ages o®er more promise.
² Credit constraints shape the degree of social mobility, income distribution and overall
development and welfare of countries.
² Government student loan programs link borrowing to educational investments, while
private lenders o®er credit based on future earnings, which depends on ability as well
as investments.
² The link between government and private credit and schooling generates a private
`credit expansion e®ect' which strengthens educational investment responses to many
education policies.
² Lack of insurance can be a major deterrent to human capital investments. Optimal
lending would provide insurance considering incentive problems arising from limited
observability and limited enforceability.
429 Future Issues
² Additional work is needed to measure the extent to which early family credit constraints
inhibit early childhood investments and a®ect later educational outcomes and earnings.
² Future empirical studies are needed to better understand the skill production technol-
ogy, especially with respect to the dynamic complementarity of investments from birth
through early adulthood.
² Given improvements in computing power, additional margins of heterogeneity and re-
alistic life-cycle dynamics can be readily introduced in quantitative general equilibrium
models of human capital.
² To better understand cross-country di®erences in aggregate human capital, additional
work is needed to consistently measure di®erences in access to and prices of credit for
education.
² Additional empirical studies are needed to better understand the extent to which dif-
ferent individual characteristics and choices, as well as government policies, a®ect re-
payment of government and private student loans.
² Adapting well-known results from the optimal contracts literature to human capital
accumulation problems should lead to interesting insights about the impacts of ability
and family wealth on schooling as well as the optimal design of government lending
programs.
² Little is known about the impact of student debt on post-school labor market perfor-
mance. Future studies in this are can shed light on the importance of moral hazard in
the design of optimal student loan contracts.
² A promising avenue of research is integrating the optimal unemployment insurance
literature with the optimal design of credit programs for human capital accumulation.
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